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A. DUTY AND BREACH
raditional notions of duty and breach as a basis of negligence ac-
tions have not changed. Continuing the case-by-case refinements,
Texas courts have addressed both issues dozens of times in 1997.
Some of the more poignant fact scenarios follow.
In Smith v. Merritt,' a passenger was injured in an automobile accident.
The passenger sued the social hosts of a party at which the nineteen-year-
old driver consumed alcoholic beverages, claiming that the hosts were
negligent and negligent per se in providing alcohol to the driver. Reason-
ing that the liability to third parties should rest with the drinker rather
than the social host, the Texas Supreme Court held that the social hosts
had no common law duty to the passenger to refrain from providing alco-
hol to the driver.2
In Thornhill v. Ronnie's 1-45 Truck Stop, Inc.,3 the owner of a hotel
defaulted on loans he had borrowed to build the hotel, and rather than
repossess the property, the lender requested that the owner stay on the
property to operate the hotel for him. The hotel later caught fire and two
guests died. Finding that the relationship between the lender and the ho-
tel owner was not simply a debtor/lender relationship because the lender
exercised control over the management and operation of the hotel, the
appellate court concluded that the lender was the possessor of the hotel
and owed a duty of care to keep the premises in a safe condition. 4
In Limon v. Gonzaba,5 a woman who was shot by her husband brought
an action against a drug and alcohol abuse counselor at the clinic where
her husband had been counseled, claiming that the counselor breached
his duty to warn her of the risk her husband posed to her. Applying the
Tarasoff/Thompson doctrine, 6 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
health care provider has a duty to warn an identifiable victim if it is rea-
sonably foreseeable that the patient will injure or kill that person. 7 In this
case, the risk that the husband would harm his wife was not reasonably
foreseeable, and therefore, the counselor owed no duty to warn the wife.8
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read9 involved the issue of an employer's liability
for the acts of an independent contractor. Kirby hired independent dis-
tributors to market vacuum cleaners, who were then required to recruit
door-to-door salespeople. The distributors were not required to conduct
background checks on prospective salespeople. In Fetzer, the plaintiff
1. 940 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1997).
2. See id. at 608.
3. 944 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
4. See id. at 789.
5. 940 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
6. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
7. See Limon, 940 S.W.2d at 240.
8. See id. at 241.
9. 945 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted).
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was sexually assaulted in her home by a Kirby salesperson who had a
history of acting in a sexually inappropriate manner. Plaintiff sued the
salesperson, the distributor, and Kirby. Kirby argued that it breached no
duty to plaintiff, asserting that it was not responsible for the acts of an
independent contractor. The court of appeals disagreed and found that
Kirby did have a duty to take reasonable precautions to deter its distribu-
tors from hiring persons with histories of crime, violence, or sexually de-
viant behavior. 10
B. CAUSATION
As with duty and breach, the concept of causation has not changed, but
it is often discussed. In Pena v. Van," two teenage girls were brutally
assaulted, raped, and murdered by a gang. The underage members of the
gang had been sold alcohol by Van. The trial court held that the assaults
and murders were not proximately caused by the sale of alcohol and
granted the defendants a summary judgment. Discussing the elements of
proximate cause (both cause in fact and foreseeability), the appellate
court reversed the summary judgment, finding that the defendant did not
produce any summary judgment evidence to show that the assaults were
unforeseeable.' 2 The court recognized that causation is usually a factual
issue best left to the jury and remanded the case for trial.' 3
In Nash v. Perry,14 the Nashes claimed that their children were mo-
lested at a day care facility and sued the defendants for common law neg-
ligence for failure to intervene or report the abuse and negligence per se
under the Texas Family Code sections regarding the reporting of abuse.
The appellate court held that the defendants were bystanders and had no
common law duty to intervene.15 The Family Code did, however, estab-
lish a minimum threshold for defendants' conduct, 16 and the case was
remanded to allow the plaintiffs to attempt to prove a violation of that
standard of care as the cause of their injuries.' 7
C. NEGLIGENT HIRING
The obligations of a potential employer were evaluated in several dif-
ferent contexts during 1997. In Guidry v. National Freight, Inc.,is a truck
driver hired by the defendant denied any prior criminal record. Without
checking with prior employers, conducting a background search, or con-
10. See id. at 859. See the further discussion of duty and breach in the context of
Liquor Liability in infra Section II (F), and the issues related to the duty to warn of the
addictive nature of tobacco in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
1997), in infra Section III (C).
11. 960 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
12. See id. at 104.
13. See id. at 105.
14. 944 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted).
15. See id. at 729.
16. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Vernon 1996).
17. See Nash, 944 S.W.2d at 729-30.
18. 944 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
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firming the driver's claims, the defendant hired the driver for long haul
trips. During an unscheduled stop at an off-route location, the driver sex-
ually assaulted Guidry. Finding that the assault on Guidry was not fore-
seeable, as she was not within the group of people with whom the driver
should have had contact, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a sum-
mary judgment for the employer. 19 Although the employer might have
been negligent in hiring the driver, it owed no duty to Guidry.20
Recall, also, the discussion of the Fetzer case in Section I(A) of this
Article. 21 A customer assaulted by a Kirby salesman sued the company
and its distributor for negligently hiring the salesman and allowing him to
perform in-home demonstrations, in light of his history of sexual crimes
and misconduct under prior employers. Recognizing that Kirby and the
distributor owed a duty to avoid putting their customers in such a danger-
ous position, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld a jury's verdict against
Kirby and the distributor for negligent hiring because Kirby failed to per-
form a reasonable investigation of the salesman before hiring him. 22
In St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital v. Agbor,23 a negligent credentialing
case, the plaintiffs sued the defendant hospital, claiming that the obstetri-
cian who injured their child during delivery should not have been given
privileges to practice medicine at the hospital. The Texas Supreme Court
held that the Texas Medical Practice Act 24 governed the action.25 This
Act protects peer review committees, which make decisions such as
granting privileges to doctors, from civil liability, unless malice on the
part of the committee can be shown. 26 Finding that the hospital's creden-
tialing process fell within that protection, a summary judgment was af-
firmed due to a lack of evidence of malice by the hospital in granting
privileges to the obstetrician. 27
D. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Application of traffic regulations in civil litigation became the crux of
several appellate discussions this past year.
In Knighten v. Louisiana Pacific Corp.,28 Knighten stopped for traffic
ahead of her and was struck twice from behind by the two defendants.
During trial, plaintiff requested an amendment to her petition to add a
negligence per se allegation, which was refused by the trial court. Hold-
ing that negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because the trial
19. See id. at 808, 811.
20. See id. at 811.
21. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
22. See Fetzer, 945 S.W.2d at 859.
23. 952 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1997).
24. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1998).
25. See Agbor, 952 S.W.2d at 504, 506.
26. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b.
27. See Agbor, 952 S.W.2d at 509.
28. 946 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ requested).
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amendment would not have asserted a "new cause of action," but merely
an additional facet of the negligence suit already being tried.29
In Waring v. Wommack, 30 Waring was riding his bicycle when he was
struck by a motorist making a left turn. Waring requested a negligence
per se instruction, which was refused. The Austin Court of Appeals held
that the duties owed by the motorist were those of a reasonable driver
and that there was no absolute duty to avoid turning left into Waring. 31
Accordingly, Waring was not entitled to an instruction that a violation of
traffic laws by the motorist could constitute negligence per se.32
E. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
1. Medical Malpractice
The field of professional negligence was often addressed by Texas
courts and the Legislature during this Survey period. Amendments to
article 4590i were confined largely to procedural issues such as filing ex-
pert reports or bonds.33 Case law, however, revisited traditional areas of
interest.
In Eckmann v. Des Rosiers,34 Eckmann filed suit against her doctor,
claiming malpractice for lack of informed consent, among other things.
Attached to the defendant doctor's motion for summary judgment was a
form disclosure of the risks of Eckmann's surgery. This form was out-
dated and did not list all known risks, as compiled by the Texas Medical
Disclosure panel. 35 However, a second form used by the hospital did
comply with the requirements, and therefore, summary judgment was
affirmed.36
In Tajchman v. Giller,37 Tajchman suffered from epilepsy and was con-
sidering the removal of a portion of her brain to correct the seizures. The
defendant doctors placed a probe in her brain to analyze the brain's inter-
nal functions. During the surgery, a vein was severed and the bleeding
caused a type of stroke. The plaintiff sued, claiming a lack of informed
consent. Although the severing of the vein was not disclosed as a possi-
ble risk or hazard, the consequences (a stroke) were disclosed, and thus, a
summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. 38
In Sampson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System,39 Sampson was suf-
fering from an insect bite and was taken to a local emergency room for
29. See id. at 640-41.
30. 945 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
31. See id. at 892.
32. See id.
33. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, Subchapter M, § 13.01 (Vernon Supp.
1998).
34. 940 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
35. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4590i, Subchapter F, § 6.04 (Vernon Supp.
1988).
36. See Eckmann, 940 S.W.2d at 396, 399.
37. 938 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
38. See id. at 99.
39. 940 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ granted).
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treatment. The emergency doctor administered some pain medication
and an antihistamine, then discharged Sampson. Fourteen hours later,
Sampson went into septic shock and was admitted to the intensive care
unit of a different hospital. In a medical malpractice case against the first
hospital, Sampson claimed that the hospital was vicariously liable for the
negligence of the independent contractor physicians staffing the emer-
gency room. Discussing both "agency by estoppel" and "apparent
agency" theories, the San Antonio Court of Appeals followed Texas pre-
cedent and the near unanimous findings of other states in imposing vicari-
ous liability on the hospital.40 The court went on to discuss sound public
policies confirming the need for vicarious liability to protect the patients
of hospitals. 41
In Parkway Hospital, Inc. v. Lee,42 Lisa Lee was given pitocin to accel-
erate the delivery of her son. Lee claimed that improper administration
of the drug caused her uterus to rupture, necessitated a hysterectomy to
save her life, and caused severe cerebral palsy to her son. Defendants
argued that Lee was not entitled to damages for injury to the family rela-
tionship. The court recognized that such injuries were significant and
worthy of compensation and affirmed the jury's $16,000,000 verdict.43
2. Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations
During this Survey period, a great number of medical negligence cases
revolved around the timely filing of suit, the discovery of injuries, and the
discovery of causation.
In Diaz v. Westphal,44 the plaintiff suffered from Hodgkins disease. His
medical doctor treated him with drugs for more than seven years. In
1987, at the end of that period, the plaintiff began suffering from urinary
tract bleeding. He was treated by another doctor who advised recon-
structive surgery in April, 1991, necessitated by the prolonged drug regi-
men administered by the first doctor. While in preparation for surgery,
Westphal was diagnosed with bladder cancer. He died in April, 1992, and
his wife brought suit against the first doctor in May, 1993. The defendant
was granted a summary judgment on the basis of the two-year statute of
limitations of article 4590i. 45 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution does not toll
the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, which are created by
statute rather than common law, as is required to invoke Open Courts
relief.46
In Husain v. Khatib,47 Khatib sought the medical care of the defend-
40. See id. at 131-32.
41. See id. at 134-35.
42. 946 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
43. See id. at 590.
44. 941 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1997).
45. See id. at 97; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANrN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1998).
46. See Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 101; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
47. 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 547, 1998 WL 107926 (March 13, 1998).
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ants for a breast exam. Although a mammogram showed anomalies,
Khatib was told that she did not have cancer. More than two years later,
Khatib was diagnosed with cancer and was told that the first mam-
mogram was not properly read or followed up. Khatib hired an attorney
eight months later, and notice letters were immediately sent. After eight-
een months of investigation, a suit was filed. The Texas Supreme Court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, measuring limitations from
the last date of treatment by the defendant. 48 The allegations of negli-
gence revolved around a failure to properly diagnose cancer, which could
only have occurred during the last treatment; since suit was filed more
than two years after that treatment, plaintiff's claims were barred.49
In Streetman v. Nguyen,50 Streetman was diagnosed with cancer in Oc-
tober, 1993. He hired an attorney in late 1994. The attorney received an
expert's report in January, 1995, indicating that an X-ray taken in March,
1992, was misread and was a cause of Streetman's extensive cancer.
Streetman died in May, 1995, and thereafter, his survivors filed a wrong-
ful death lawsuit. Finding that the statutory action for wrongful death did
not satisfy the elements necessary for an Open Courts tolling of the stat-
ute of limitations, the court affirmed the summary judgment for the
defendants. 51
The court of appeals grappled with the issue of whether the absolute
two-year statute of limitations set out in article 4590i applies to negli-
gence claims brought against a professional association in Campbell v.
MacGregor Medical Association.52 Finding that it does, the court deter-
mined that a professional association falls within the definition of "health
care provider" in article 4590i.53 The court then recognized that the arti-
cle 4590i statute of limitations bars a negligence claim when the injury
was known within two years of its occurrence, even though the substan-
dard care was not discovered until later.54
In Terry v. Abito,55 plaintiff's shoulder was dislocated during a therapy
session with physical therapists. Plaintiff sent timely notice of his intent
to assert a health care liability claim against the therapists and filed his
lawsuit two years and six days after the injury. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the two-year statute
of limitations. Plaintiff appealed the summary judgment, contending that
the statute of limitations was tolled, and thus, the notice letters added
seventy-five days to the two year limitations period. Contrary to the
Campbell opinion,56 the court of appeals reasoned that article 4590i does
48. See id. at *2
49. See id.
50. 943 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
51. See id. at 171-72.
52. No. 01-94-01277-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 1997, writ re-
quested) (not designated for publication), 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2215.
53. See id. at *5.
54. See id.
55. 961 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
56. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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not apply to physical therapists; plaintiff's claim instead fell under the
two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of general
negligence.57
3. Legal Malpractice
In Delp v. Douglas,58 the Delps brought a legal malpractice suit against
the attorneys who had represented the Delps in a business dispute. Mr.
Delp later filed personal bankruptcy, and his "asset," the malpractice
claim, was purchased by the insurance carrier for the defendant attor-
neys. Shortly after the purchase, the carrier (as the plaintiff) entered into
an agreed dismissal of the claim against the attorneys. The Delps argued
that the legal malpractice claim could not be assigned in Texas. The court
of appeals agreed and set aside the dismissal because the "plaintiff" car-
rier did not have the necessary privity to the malpractice and the
attorneys.59
In the complicated web of the estate distribution for an oil and gas
mogul in Houston, the law firm of Vinson & Elkins was accused of mal-
practice, inter alia, in Vinson & Elkins v. Moran.60 Two of the benefi-
ciaries were assigned the claims of the remaining beneficiaries and filed
suit against Vinson & Elkins. In appealing the $35,000,000 verdict, Vin-
son & Elkins argued that the plaintiffs could not take an assignment of a
legal malpractice claim. The court of appeals agreed, holding that public
policy prohibits the assignment of legal malpractice claims.61
Arce v. Burrow62 concerned a series of explosions at a chemical plant in
Pasadena, Texas, that killed twenty-three people and injured hundreds
more. A number of those people were represented by the Umphrey,
Burrow firm. Their claims were settled for varying amounts and were
dismissed by agreement. Later, the plaintiffs accused the firm of negoti-
ating the claims for an aggregate amount, then dividing that amount
among the various plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice claim
that was dismissed summarily for lack of evidence of damages because
the court of appeals held that the amounts received were fair, and there-
fore, the plaintiffs suffered no monetary damages. 63 Plaintiffs appealed,
arguing that a forfeiture of the attorneys' fees was warranted, even with-
out individual monetary damages. Finding that a breach of the fiduciary
duty owed to a client might justify a fee forfeiture (even without actual
damages), the court of appeals held that whether to forfeit a fee is best
left to the jury in a legal malpractice claim; however, the amount of for-
57. See Terry, 961 S.W.2d at 531; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1998).
58. 948 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ granted).
59. See id. at 486, 491.
60. 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
61. See id. at 392-93.
62. 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
63. See id. at 244.
1266 [Vol. 51
PERSONAL TORTS
feiture is to be decided by the court.64
II. ADDITIONAL TORTS
Outside of negligence actions, Texas appellate courts were presented
with many opportunities to write on less traditional torts during the Sur-
vey period.
A. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT
In Rogers v. Cassidy,65 a city attorney brought a defamation action
against a private citizen who had written a letter to the editor that alleged
improprieties committed by the city attorney in connection with city elec-
tions. The court applied New York Times v. Sullivan,66 in holding that a
public official must show actual malice in order to recover damages for
defamation, and found that the defendant never doubted the veracity of
his allegations and did not act with malice.67
An individual committed suicide after a newspaper published a report
listing his name and the fact that he had been arrested for indecent expo-
sure in Hogan v. Hearst Corp.68 His family sued the newspaper and the
author. The court of appeals held that publication of information ob-
tained from otherwise publicly available police reports was not public dis-
closure of private facts. 69
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In C.M. v. Tomball Regional Hospital,70 a minor was raped, and her
mother took her to the hospital twenty-three hours later to be examined.
The head nurse interviewed the minor in a public waiting room, implied
doubt that the minor had actually been raped, and refused to prepare a
"rape kit" on the minor. The plaintiff and her mother brought a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against the nurse. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants,
noting that the plaintiff's evidence did not rise to the necessary level of
emotional distress.71
In Johnson v. Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co.,72 Johnson was participat-
ing in a march along Highway 59 in Houston when a Standard Fruit truck
crashed into the procession. Although Johnson was not physically injured
by the wreck, he brought a claim for negligent infliction of physical inju-
ries (exacerbation of his Vietnam post-traumatic stress syndrome) and
64. See id. at 245.
65. 946 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. See Rogers, 946 S.W.2d at 444-46.
68. 945 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
69. See id. at 250-51.
70. 961 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
71. See id. at 245.
72. No. 01-95-01239-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 1997, pet. granted)
(not designated for publication), 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 4757.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following a lengthy discus-
sion of emotional distress damages and from which torts they are recover-
able, 73 the appellate court held that no special relationship exists between
a driver and the general public; therefore, the Standard Fruit driver com-
mitted no negligence against Johnson.74 However, recognizing that the
conduct of the driver could be interpreted as intentional or reckless inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court reversed the defendant's summary
judgment.75
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
The courts visited novel areas of contractor responsibility and resur-
rected aged theories of attractive nuisance in 1997 premises cases.
In Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 76 a drilling crew-member em-
ployed by an independent contractor was injured. He and his wife sued
the general contractor and its on-site representative for negligence. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the court of
appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish the elements of premises-defect liability
against the on-site representative and failed to prove respondeat superior
liability against the general contractor for the negligence of the
employer. 77
An intoxicated boy was killed while climbing an electrical tower in
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Timmons.78 His mother sued the electric
company under the attractive nuisance doctrine, claiming that the tower
was such a nuisance. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
electric company and was affirmed at the appellate level.79 The appellate
court held that recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine was pre-
cluded because the boy was of sufficient age and experience to know of
the dangers of being near high-voltage lines. 80
In Wal-Mart Stores v. Gonzalez,81 plaintiff was shopping at Wal-Mart
when she slipped and fell on macaroni salad that had been spilled on the
floor. She was awarded damages of $100,000. Wal-Mart appealed, argu-
ing that there was insufficient evidence that it had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition of the macaroni. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's judgment in light of evidence demonstrat-
ing Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge of the spilled macaroni. 82
In Silva v. Spohn Health System Corp.,83 an employee of the defendant
73. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
74. See Johnson, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS at *6.
75. See id. at *7.
76. 952 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1997).
77. See id. at 530.
78. 947 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1997).
79. See id. at 192.
80. See id. at 194.
81. 954 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. filed).
82. See id. at 779.
83. 951 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
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hospital was stabbed as she was entering her car to go home. At the time
she was stabbed, she was standing on the curb adjoining the street and
the defendant's property. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
defendant upon the trial court's finding that the defendant did not owe
plaintiff a duty when she was on the curb. The court of appeals reversed
and held that the defendant was required to protect plaintiff from reason-
ably foreseeable criminal acts on or adjacent to the defendant's
property.84
Plaintiff was raped when another tenant from her apartment complex
entered her apartment through a sliding glass door in Cain v. Timberwalk
Apartments Partners, Inc. 85 Plaintiff sued the landlord and management
company, and a jury found in favor of the defendants. The court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that the negligence instruction submitted to the
jury did not reflect the rule that a landowner or apartment manager has a
duty to use ordinary care to protect against unreasonable and foreseeable
risks of harm by a third party.86
D. PRODUCT LIABILITY
Texas courts wrote detailed and thorough opinions in the field of prod-
uct liability ranging from automobiles to asbestosis in 1997.
In Sipes v. General Motors Corp.,87 Sipes was injured in an automobile
accident and sued the automobile's manufacturer, claiming that the fail-
ure of the airbag to deploy was the result of a defective product. The trial
court granted a summary judgment for the defendant based on the de-
fendant's argument that the collision was a side-impact collision, which
should not deploy the driver's front airbag. The appellate court noted the
conflicting evidence of the direction of force and held that such a conflict
was a fact issue best left to a jury; accordingly, the court reversed.88 Fur-
ther, in a well-reasoned discussion of the various theories in an automo-
bile product liability action, the court held that the other sources of
summary judgment evidence offered by the plaintiffs raised necessary fact
issues regarding defective marketing and design, supporting a reversal. 89
In Rodriguez v. Hyundai Motor Co.,90 plaintiff was a passenger in a
Hyundai that was involved in a rollover accident. She sued the driver and
the manufacturer on various theories of negligence and product liability.
The appellate court reversed a jury's take-nothing verdict, holding that
the evidence presented at trial required a jury question on a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. 91 Further, the court noted that the
same proof offered (roof crush and crash-worthiness) could support theo-
84. See id. at 95-96.
85. 942 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ granted).
86. See id. at 703.
87. 946 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no writ).
88. See id. at 152.
89. See id. at 156-60.
90. 944 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted).
91. See id. at 771.
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ries of both product liability and implied warranty, and both questions
should be submitted to a jury since the evidence had been admitted.92
In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin,93 plaintiffs successfully
tried an action against Owens-Corning, alleging various product liability
theories and that asbestos exposure caused a number of different injuries.
Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by consolidating
eighteen different plaintiffs for a single trial. In discussing Rule 174 and
the criteria supporting the consolidation (common issues of law and fact
among the cases), the court of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict.94 Fur-
ther, consistency in the verdicts among the plaintiffs did not support the
defendant's claim of prejudice. 95
E. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Efforts to turn the dismissal of criminal charges into successful civil
litigation were occasionally addressed by Texas appellate courts during
the Survey period.
One such case is Lang v. City of Nacogdoches.96 Vira Lang was ninety-
one years old, and living in Nacogdoches. Her son William was entrusted
with her finances, to which her son Ben objected. Ben would occasion-
ally visit, and these visits upset his mother. Vira then gave William a
power of attorney to prosecute trespassers. William instructed Ben to
cease the upsetting visits; Ben ignored the instruction, and William called
the police and filed criminal trespass charges against Ben. After the
charges were dropped, Ben sued William and all of the county officials
involved in his fourteen hour incarceration, alleging malicious prosecu-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment for most of the defendants, holding that
the conduct of William was not outrageous, nor was the suit timely
filed. 97
In Digby v. Texas Bank,98 Digby used life insurance policies as collat-
eral for a loan from Texas Bank. During repayment, Digby borrowed
from the insurance policies to repay the loan, allegedly with the knowl-
edge and consent of a vice-president of Texas Bank. When Digby later
defaulted, Texas Bank attempted to liquidate the collateral and allegedly
learned for the first time of Digby's actions. Texas Bank filed with the
FDIC a Report of Apparent Crime regarding Digby's actions. Digby was
later acquitted by a jury. In a detailed discussion of the elements of mali-
cious prosecution, the court of appeals recognized evidence of each ele-
ment and reversed the summary judgment for Texas Bank.99
92. See id. at 771-72.
93. 942 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
94. See id. at 716-20.
95. See id. at 720.
96. 942 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied).
97. See id. at 758-60.
98. 943 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1997, writ denied).




Responsibility for the sale and provision of alcohol remained a hotly
contested area of tort law, revolving around the interpretation of Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Code sections 106.01 and 106.06(a) 100 and common
law duties and obligations.
In Estate of Catlin v. GMC,10 1 a woman was killed after being struck by
a car driven by an employee who had become intoxicated at a fish fry
held on the defendant employer's property. The woman's estate sued the
defendant and its employees, and the trial court granted the defendants a
summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed and claimed that because defend-
ant adopted a policy regarding the consumption of alcohol on its prem-
ises, and thereafter failed to follow the policy, a legal duty was created.
The court of appeals concluded that the mere creation of an internal pol-
icy regarding alcohol consumption does not create a duty per se; such a
duty would have been created only if the defendant had actual knowledge
of the employee's intoxication and then performed an affirmative act of
control over the employee's actions.102
In Kovar v. Krampitz,10 3 an eighteen-year-old boy was killed in a car
accident after consuming alcohol at a party hosted by the defendants.
The parents of the deceased argued that the defendants owed both com-
mon law and statutory duties to avoid making alcohol available to their
son and to exercise reasonable care to ensure their son's safety after he
became drunk. There was no evidence that the defendants provided the
alcohol consumed by the deceased. Affirming the trial court's judgment,
the court of appeals held that the defendants owed no common law duty
as hosts to the deceased and did not violate any statutory duty created in
the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code. 10 4
In Gonzalez v. South Dallas Club,10 5 Gonzalez and her friends were
involved in an altercation at defendant's bar. Defendant's employees in-
tervened and allowed Gonzalez to leave the bar through a back door to
avoid an additional altercation outside. About a mile from the bar, the
groups clashed again, and Gonzalez was injured. Gonzalez sued the bar,
alleging violations of the Dram Shop Act'0 6 and negligent security. Be-
cause the defendant had no control over the premises where the injury
occurred, nor the parties causing the injuries, summary judgment was af-
firmed because the defendant had no duty to prevent the criminal con-
duct of third parties off of the defendant's premises. 10 7
100. TEx. ALCO. BEy. CODE ANN. §§ 106.01, 106.06(a) (Vernon 1995).
101. 936 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
102. See id. at 451.
103. 941 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1996, no writ).
104. See id. at 252-54; TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 106.01, 106.06(a).
105. 951 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1997, no writ).
106. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2 (Vernon 1995).
107. See Gonzalez, 951 S.W.2d at 75-76.
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G. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
Recognizing a cause of action for general negligence in the keeping of
medical records, one Texas appellate court detailed both the public poli-
cies and the sister-state authority to support such an action in Ortega v.
Trevino.108
Linda Ortega was injured during her birth. In a medical negligence
action against the obstetrician, all of Ortega's medical records were lost
or destroyed by the obstetrician. A separate suit was filed against the
obstetrician, alleging that he had a duty to preserve and maintain her
medical records. The loss of the records presented an insurmountable
hardship with regard to the medical negligence action for which the ob-
stetrician should be held responsible. The court of appeals recognized
the procedural remedies available to a party in the face of spoliation of
evidence, specifically the presumption that the evidence would have fa-
vored the opposite party.'0 9 The court further acknowledged that several
other states have recognized an action exclusively for the spoliation of
key evidence where the defendant had an obligation to preserve the evi-
dence." 0 In light of the trend towards recognizing interference with pro-
spective contracts in Texas, and the supporting authority from other
states that have directly addressed the issue, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals remanded the case for a jury's resolution of whether the destruc-
tion violated a duty owed by the obstetrician to his patient to not lose or
destroy medical records."'
III. DEFENSES
Very few new defenses were raised by appellate courts, and the tradi-
tional theories underwent little change during the Survey period.
Although some legislative changes might be considered defense-ori-
ented," 2 the practical impact on litigation will not be known for several
years.
A. GOVERNMENTAL/OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs were struck by a police car during a high speed police chase in
Wadewitz v. Montgomery."13 The trial court denied the defendant of-
ficer's and the defendant city's motion for summary judgment, and the
court of appeals affirmed on an interlocutory appeal. The issue before
the Texas Supreme Court was whether the police officer responding to an
emergency call conclusively established that he acted in good faith enti-
108. 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted).
109. See id. at 220-21.
110. See id. at 221-22.
111. See id. at 223.
112. See, e.g., the forum non conveniens in TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.051 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998) and the limitations of landowners liability in TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
113. 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997).
1272 [Vol. 51
PERSONAL TORTS
tling him to the official immunity defense. The Court applied the City of
Lancaster v. Chambers1 4 test in which good faith depends on how a rea-
sonably prudent officer could have assessed both the need to which an
officer responds and the risks of the officer's course of action, based on
the officer's perception at the time of the accident. The Texas Supreme
Court found that neither the city nor the officer provided conclusive evi-
dence of the officer's good faith under the Chambers standard and af-
firmed the denial of summary judgment. 115
In City of Pharr v. Ruiz," 6 Officer Castillo and three other patrol cars
were in pursuit of a suspicious-looking vehicle when Castillo careened
into the Ruiz's car. Ruiz sued the city, alleging that the officers breached
their duty to drive with due regard and, pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims
Act, 117 failed to act in good faith by balancing the need to apprehend the
suspect with the risk of harm to the public. The trial court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that a fact issue ex-
isted regarding whether the actions of the officers were discretionary and
performed in good faith. The court of appeals determined that the of-
ficers' acts were discretionary, but upheld the denial of summary judg-
ment because plaintiffs successfully rebutted defendants' good faith
claim." 8
Teresa, a sixth grader, reported to her teacher that she had been
threatened by one of her classmates in Downing v. Brown.119 The
teacher held Teresa and her classmate after class one day to resolve their
differences. The teacher believed that the problem was solved even
though Teresa later wrote her a note about her fear of the other girl. A
few days later, the girl attacked Teresa after school and Teresa's mother
sued the school district and the teacher for Teresa's injuries. Summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendants. The Texas Supreme
Court reviewed the case and determined that the teacher enjoyed quali-
fied immunity from personal liability for her actions in maintaining class-
room discipline. 120
In Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Watt,' 2 1 a prison inmate al-
legedly spit on an officer and was ordered to be placed in a "management
cell". The inmate violently struggled for some time as guards tried to
restrain him and place him in the cell. He died as a result of the struggle.
The inmate's mother filed suit against the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ), and the trial court denied TDCJ's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the court applied the Chambers official immunity
114. 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).
115. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467.
116. 944 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
117. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
118. See Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d at 715-16.
119. 935 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1996).
120. See id. at 113.
121. 949 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
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test 122 and held that a reasonably prudent officer in the same or similar
circumstances would have believed that the force used to place Watt in
the cell was necessary. 123 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed and
rendered summary judgment in favor of TDCJ.124
B. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
Efforts to bring direct actions against the State pursuant to the limited
waivers of immunity embodied in the Texas Tort Claims Act were slightly
modified by the Legislature in 1997,125 mostly in areas of procedure
rather than substance. Appellate courts are now addressing the 1995
changes to the Texas Tort Claims Act, but again, the changes have had
little effect on substantive issues.
1. Premises or Special Defect
In Sipes v. Texas Department of Transportation,126 Jamie Sipes was
struck by a car when she tried to walk to a store located across the high-
way. The median at the crossover was covered with tall grass and weeds
that obstructed her view. Sipes sued the Department of Transportation
(DOT) under a premises liability claim based on the Texas Tort Claims
Act, arguing that the weeds were a special defect. Summary judgment
was entered in favor of DOT and affirmed by the court of appeals. 127
The court of appeals held that the vegetation was not a special defect or a
public nuisance, as required to pierce the State's sovereign immunity.1 28
2. Condition or Use of Property
In Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Mc-
Clain,129 Leta McClain, a mental patient at Austin State Hospital, died as
a result of being physically assaulted by Pugh, another resident, with
either a metal rod removed from a hospital locker or a metal foot pedal
removed from his wheelchair. Pugh had a long criminal record and was
involuntarily admitted to the hospital because he was thought to be a
danger to himself and others. McClain's family sued the hospital, alleging
that hospital employees were negligent in allowing Pugh, whose danger-
ous propensities were known, to have access to either the rod or the
pedal. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, and the court of appeals agreed, holding that the hospital's actions
involved the use of tangible property as required by the Texas Tort
Claims Act.130
122. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
123. See Watt, 949 S.W.2d at 566.
124. See id. at 567.
125. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
126. 949 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
127. See id. at 518, 522.
128. See id. at 521.
129. 947 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ requested).
130. See id. at 698.
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C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS
With federal legislation becoming more pervasive, the defense of pre-
emption is becoming more common. Last year saw a variety of different
federal statutes working their way into Texas civil litigation.
One example is American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell.131 In 1952,
Grinnell started smoking cigarettes. Thirty-three years later, he was diag-
nosed with lung cancer. He filed suit against the manufacturer of the
cigarettes and died before the suit reached trial. His family continued the
suit, pursuing theories of product liability, negligence, misrepresentation,
and breach of warranty. Through a series of motions, the trial court
granted the defendants' summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims.
Finding that the dangers associated with smoking were "common knowl-
edge" from 1952 forward (contrary to the assertions of the defendant and
the tobacco industry, even in sworn testimony before Congress), the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment against the defec-
tive design theories.132 However, holding that the addictive nature of to-
bacco was not common knowledge, the Court remanded the failure to
warn and marketing defects actions to the trial court.133 Since Congress
enacted federal legislation related to appropriate warnings in 1969,134 any
claims related to warning and marketing defects after 1969 were pre-
empted by federal law. 135
In Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo,136 Sifuentes was drinking at the
Tigua Indian Reservation Casino and was served alcohol past the point at
which she became obviously intoxicated. She left the casino and was in-
volved in a head-on collision off of the reservation's land. Her estate
sued the Indian tribe that owned and operated the casino, alleging viola-
tions of the Dram Shop Act,137 and other negligent activities. The tribe
argued that it was immune from personal injury suits as a federally recog-
nized Indian Reservation. 38 The court of appeals recognized that no
state has allowed a private plaintiff to sue a tribe for personal injuries. 39
Even though the Dram Shop Act was created pursuant to the state's po-
lice powers (which preempt the tribal immunity in the criminal context),
attempting to collect money damages by an injured individual did not
qualify under the limited waiver of the tribe's immunity. 40 Accordingly,
the tribe's summary judgment was affirmed. 14'
In Trevino v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,142 Trevino and
131. 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
132. See id. at 428-29.
133. See id.
134. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1998).
135. See Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 438-40.
136. 954 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1997, pet. filed).
137. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2 (Vernon 1995).
138. See 25 U.S.C. § 1300(g) (1983 & Supp. 1997).
139. See Holguin, 954 S.W.2d at 847.
140. See id. at 854.
141. See id.
142. 958 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet, filed).
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two of her children were killed in an auto-train collision. Suit was filed
against the railroad, alleging negligent failure to warn regarding the cross-
ing. The defendant obtained a summary judgment, arguing that federal
law governed the railroad's duties. Finding that no federal regulations
governed the railroad's duties to warn of the dangers at the particular
crossing where the accident occurred, the court of appeals reversed. 143
Although federal law governs warnings required at federally-funded rail-
road crossings, the crossing at issue was not specifically covered under the
railway crossing regulations. 44
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The selection of the cause of action will govern the appropriate statute
of limitations for the plaintiff. Actions sounding in fraud, or governed by
specific statutes, were recently addressed by Texas courts in the context
of personal tort litigation.
In Shannon v. Law-Yone,145 plaintiff was admitted to Brookhaven Psy-
chiatric Pavilion as a voluntary inpatient for treatment and expressed a
desire to end treatment and leave the facility but was discouraged by his
doctor and others. Plaintiff later sued his doctor, other doctors, and the
psychiatric hospital, asserting numerous claims including fraud and negli-
gence. Defendants argued that the suit should be governed by the two-
year statute of limitations because it involved personal injury claims,
rather than the four-year statute of limitations allowed in cases involving
fraud. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that "[tjhe mere fact that [plaintiff]
seeks damages more often associated with personal injury claims, i.e.,
emotional and mental anguish, is not determinative of which statute of
limitation applies"; since plaintiff's claims sounded in fraud, the four-year
statute governed. 146
In Reames v. Hawthorne-Seving, Inc.,147 plaintiff was injured on a con-
veyor belt in 1993. The belt was installed at the plant in 1982. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on a stat-
ute of repose requiring that certain suits against one who constructs an
improvement to real property be brought within ten years after the con-
struction of the improvement. The court of appeals held that the con-
veyor was an improvement to the property and that, because plaintiffs
filed suit more than ten years after the conveyor's installation, their claim
was barred by statute.' 48
143. See id. at 207.
144. See id. at 206; 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20153 (1997).
145. 950 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
146. Id. at 437.
147. 949 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
148. See id. at 762, 764; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon 1986).
For a more detailed analysis of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions, see




Efforts to impute the responsibility of one tortfeasor to a different
party were discussed in the context of construction sites and auto acci-
dents in this Survey period. Although changes were made to joint
tortfeasors' liability in chapter 33 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code
in 1995,149 those changes have not yet worked their way into the appel-
late level.
In Good v. Dow Chemical Co.,150 Good was a pipefitter working for a
company building a hydrocarbon plant for Dow Chemical. While work-
ing on the project, Good was injured and sued the owner of the project,
Dow Chemical. Holding that Good's employer was the contractor, and
not Dow Chemical, the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment re-
garding allegations of an unsafe workplace because the control of Good's
activities fell to his employer. 151 Further, Dow Chemical did not retain
sufficient control over the project to be responsible as a landowner. 152
IV. IMPORTANT ISSUES
A. DAMAGES
During the Survey period, jury damage awards remained largely un-
burdened by appellate review, provided an appropriate threshold of evi-
dence was present in the record.
1. Mental Anguish
Shirley Trevino gave birth to a stillborn baby while under the medical
supervision of Edinburg General Hospital in Edinburg Hospital Authority
v. Trevino.153 Both Trevino and her husband sued the hospital and judg-
ment was entered in their favor. One of the elements of damages sought
by the plaintiffs was mental anguish. Trevino offered evidence of her
preparations in expectation of the arrival of her baby, the pain she exper-
ienced upon losing the baby, and the deterioration of her marriage that
resulted. The Texas Supreme Court held that the evidence presented re-
lated to the grief that Trevino felt over the loss of the baby as a separate
individual, and not as a part of her body.154 Noting that under Krishnan
v. Sepulveda,155 a woman must provide evidence of mental anguish dam-
ages resulting from negligent treatment that causes the loss of a baby as
part of the woman's body, the Court remanded her damage claim to the
149. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33 (Vernon 1997).
150. 945 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
151. See id. at 880.
152. See id. at 880-82. See also the discussion of vicarious liability of hospitals for the
malpractice of emergency room doctors in supra Section I (E)(1).
153. 941 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1997).
154. See id. at 79.
155. 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995).
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trial court for a new trial.156
2. Punitive Damages
The codifications of exemplary damage elements in chapter 41 of the
Civil Practice & Remedies Code157 became effective on September 1,
1995, but have not yet had an impact at the appellate level. Instead, the
Moriel decision' 58 is still having the greatest impact on Texas jurispru-
dence regarding punitive damages.
After establishing an insurance company's gross negligence, the Texas
Supreme Court has recognized that economic ruin caused by the insur-
ance company's bad faith may support an award of punitive damages.159
A plaintiff must satisfy the gross negligence standard created by Trans-
portation Insurance Co. v. Moriel,160 which requires proof that the insur-
ance company was actually aware that its actions involved an extreme
risk of harm, such as financial ruin, and was nevertheless consciously in-
different to the insured's rights or welfare.161 Evidence of that extreme
degree of risk in the form of economic harm will satisfy the evidentiary
threshold to support a jury's damage award. 162
B. WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES
Inattention to detail proved costly for one set of wrongful death de-
fendants in 1997. In Avila v. St. Luke's Lutheran Hospital,163 Jimenez
died while under the medical care of the defendants. His adult children
filed wrongful death and survival actions against the defendants later that
same year. The case was settled and a final take-nothing judgment was
entered. Later, Jimenez's minor daughter filed a second wrongful death
suit against many of the same defendants. The defendants sought sum-
mary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel, arguing that the same
issues had been resolved between the same parties in a prior proceeding.
Because the prior suit, the release, and the final judgment were all related
specifically to the adult children and did not purport to represent all
wrongful death beneficiaries, the court held that the minor child was not
a party. 164 Further, the issues of liability were not actually litigated in the
agreed settlement and final judgment. 65 Accordingly, the summary
judgment for the defendants was reversed and the minor child's action
remanded for trial.' 66
156. See Trevino, 941 S.W.2d at 79; see also Parkway Hospital, 941 S.W.2d at 590; supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
157. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
158. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
159. See Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1997).
160. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
161. See id. at 19-20.
162. See Universal Life, 950 S.W.2d at 57.
163. 948 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).






An insurance company's obligations of defense and indemnification
were often litigated during the past year, with the insurance company
usually seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve its contractual duties.
Although the law related to the issues did not change in 1997, many crea-
tive new efforts to invoke coverage were presented to the appellate
courts.
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan,167 Mr. Gage was a photo
lab clerk who made extra prints of some revealing photos of Ms. Cowan
and distributed them to his friends. Discovering this, Ms. Cowan sued
Mr. Gage, who requested both a defense to the suit and indemnification
for any judgment from his homeowner's insurance policy. The insurance
company ultimately denied coverage, claiming that Ms. Cowan's suit did
not involve a "bodily injury" as defined by the policy and that Mr. Gage's
conduct was not an "accident." The Texas Supreme Court agreed with
both assertions.168 The Court held that without physical manifestations,
Ms. Cowan's damage claims were for humiliation and embarrassment
only and were not a bodily injury; further, Mr. Gage's intentional tort was
not an accident as defined by the policy.169
In Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. McKee,170 McKee's eleven-
year-old daughter was injured as a passenger in a one-car accident. Mc-
Kee sought a declaratory judgment against his business insurance policy,
pursuing underinsured benefits for his daughter. The Texas Supreme
Court rendered judgment for the insurer, holding that the business auto
policy would not provide coverage to family members of business em-
ployees. 171 Although McKee was the president and sole shareholder of
the business, he was not the policyholder-the business was. Since the
business had no "family members," the Court held that McKee's daugh-
ter was not entitled to underinsured benefits. 172
Griffin was injured by gunshots fired from a vehicle driven by Royal in
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin.173 Griffin sued
Royal and others for his injuries. Seeking both defense and indemnity,
Royal notified his auto insurance carrier. The carrier provided a defense
in the suit (subject to a reservation of the carrier's right to refuse indem-
nification) and filed an action for a declaration that it had no obligations
to Royal. Finding the allegations in the personal injury suit to be inten-
tional torts, the Texas Supreme Court held that the gunshots constituted
intentional conduct and an exception to the carrier's duty to defend and
indemnify. 174
167. 945 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1997).
168. See id. at 820.
169. See id. at 827.
170. 943 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1997).
171. See id. at 456.
172. See id. at 457.
173. 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997).
174. See id. at 83.
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In Wessinger v. Fire Insurance Exchange,175 Wessinger got drunk and
inexplicably punched Morrison several times in the face, causing injuries
that included permanent vision loss. Wessinger, in the lawsuit filed by
Morrison, sought coverage for his actions under his homeowner's policy,
arguing that his intoxication meant that his actions (which he did not re-
member) were not intentional but were merely an accidental result of the
intoxication. In this declaratory judgment action by the homeowner's
carrier, the court of appeals held that voluntary intoxication does not de-
stroy the intentional nature of the conduct; since the conduct was not
"accidental" as covered by the policy, the insurer was not required to
indemnify Wessinger for the resulting damages.' 76
D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Since the reform of the Workers' Compensation system, very few cases
have been litigated in the trial courts, and even fewer have been ap-
pealed; 1997 was no exception.
In Trico Technologies Corp. v. Montiel,177 Montiel was injured on the
job, filed a claim for benefits under Trico's workers' compensation insur-
ance policy, and was later discharged by Trico. After Montiel died, his
wife sued Trico, alleging that Trico wrongfully discharged Montiel in re-
taliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. During pre-trial dis-
covery, Trico learned that although Montiel stated on his application that
he did not have an alcohol problem, he was a diagnosed alcoholic. The
trial court found for Trico, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the
after-acquired evidence doctrine (evidence discovered after a hire that
would have prevented the initial hiring) has been adopted as a limitation
on an employee's recovery for a retaliatory discharge claim under the
Workers' Compensation Act. 178 Under the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine, therefore, an "employee is only entitled to back pay from the date
of the unlawful discharge to the date that the employer discovered evi-
dence of the employee's misconduct."'1 79
In Simplex Electric Corp. v. Holcomb,180 Holcomb, a Simplex em-
ployee, was injured at work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation
benefits with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, which then
notified Simplex. Simplex gave its insurance carrier notice of the claim,
and the carrier had sixty days in which to contest the compensability of
Holcomb's injury. The carrier never formally contested compensability,
and Simplex sought to invoke its right to contest compensability even
though its carrier accepted liability for the payment of benefits. The
175. 949 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
176. See id. at 840-41.
177. 949 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1997).
178. See id. at 310.
179. Id. at 312.
180. 949 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
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Commission determined that Simplex lacked standing to challenge com-
pensability because its carrier missed the statutory deadline. The district
court affirmed the decision, as did the court of appeals.181 The appellate
court reasoned that the carrier's inadvertent failure to contest the com-
pensability of the claim by the sixty-day statutory deadline did not give
the employer standing to contest the employee's claim.182
181. See id. at 447.
182. See id. at 448.
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